Is it possible for a Catholic not to cooperate in evil?

Dr. Kim is a practicing Catholic and a dedicated biochemical researcher. She is an expert in fact in the applications of adult stem cells for cancer treatment. The firm where she worked for the past 12 years was acquired in a merger by a larger pharmacy corporation and her position was downsized.

After experiencing six months of unemployment, she was contacted by a small firm trying to develop medical uses for human stem cells. This new California company has start up money as a result of Proposition 71. Unfortunately, because of Proposition 71, California's public research dollars for stem cell research are limited to embryonic stem cells.

Even though Dr. Kim's research would be restricted to working with the stem cells only after they had been removed from the embryos and she would not have to be involved directly in the killing of any embryos, she felt uncomfortable. Despite the need to get back to work, she sought the counsel of the Church.

Her pastor referred her to the Diocesan Pro-Life Office which was happy to help her. Two Catholic pro-life consultants --- a physician and a priest --- listened to Dr. Kim and were quickly convinced that she should not accept the job offer since it would involve her in "proximate cooperation" in evil, and would certainly be the cause of scandal when her fellow parishioners found out what she was doing.

What does "proximate cooperation" in evil mean? Is that serious enough to prevent Dr. Kim from taking the job, especially in light of her need for income?

The moral notion of "cooperation in evil" is not new in the Catholic Church. Discussions about the moral implications involved in cooperating in evil are found in most textbooks used in seminaries prior to Vatican II.

Simply put, one "cooperates" in evil, when one does not actually do the evil deed (as in the example above, Dr. Kim would not be killing the embryos) but nevertheless is involved in one of two ways, either actively by "lending a hand" or passively by "failing to prevent" the evil when it was possible to do so. (It is clear that Dr. Kim's job would essentially involve cells that were deliberately and knowingly the result of killing human embryos.) Cooperation in evil can be through advice, encouragement, nagging, goading to action, protecting the operator, or actually helping carry out the evil action.

For many Catholics, the classic Catholic moral teaching about cooperation in evil was brought to their attention during the presidential campaign in 2004. The question of whether a Catholic could vote for a candidate that espoused a political position in opposition to Church teaching was proposed to Rome. In July 2004 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, wrote a memorandum for the American bishops:

"A Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil, and so unworthy to present himself or herself for Holy Communion, if he or she were to deliberately vote for a candidate precisely because of the candidate's permissive stand on abortion and/or euthanasia. When a Catholic does not share a candidate's stand in favor of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate reasons."

While the issue regarding political choices was the catalyst to bring the moral distinction of formal and material cooperation to the fore, it certainly is not the only arena, or even the most common arena, that Catholics find themselves in when the distinction can be useful:

---Catholics in health care, especially those working in non-Catholic institutions, often find themselves in difficult situations when they are assigned to assist in immoral medical procedures like direct sterilizations.

---Catholic pharmacists, working in large chain stores, are concerned about being forced to sell or even give clinical advice about artificial birth control and abortifacient products.

---Parents are concerned about allowing their children to receive vaccines that may have been produced with biological material harvested from aborted fetuses.

---And what about paying taxes to local, state or federal governments that use them for immoral purposes, such as funding abortions or embryonic stem cell research, providing for capital punishment or prosecuting an unjust war? Is not one cooperating in evil when he/she pays his/her taxes if the government uses the money for immoral purposes?

'Formal' and 'material' cooperation
How does traditional Catholic moral theology help us negotiate such a landscape? Is it ever possible for a Catholic to work in any capacity whatsoever in a medical facility that performs immoral procedures? Can a Catholic take a job in a market that sells adult magazines? Is it a sin to subscribe to a cable or dish network that offers pornographic channels, since, even if you are not paying for those channels, you are still supporting a business that is doing something immoral?

The answer may be found in the distinction between "formal" and "material" cooperation, as used by Cardinal Ratzinger above. Formal cooperation is defined as either having the same intention as the perpetrator of the evil or in giving help that is virtually "essential" to the evil act. Material cooperation is help that is either remotely or maybe even closely but still not essentially associated with the evil act.

Ultimately, formal cooperation in an evil act is morally equivalent to doing the act yourself, and so can never be justified. Proximate and remote material cooperation in evil are only permitted with extenuating circumstances and when the four conditions for the principle of double effect are fulfilled:

---The action by which the cooperator aids the operator must itself be morally good or at least morally indifferent.

---From the action by which the cooperator aids the operator, there must flow at least equally immediately as from their cause two effects, the one good and the other evil.

---The good effect alone may be willed or intended by the cooperator.

---There must be a proportionately serious reason for giving the help which is the cause of the two effects.

In the case presented at the beginning, it is clear to see that research involving human embryos could not meet the four conditions in the principle of double effect. While Dr. Kim would not be directly killing the embryos, she could not avoid the fact that she would be involved directly with "embryonic" stem cell research which is only possible with the deliberate destruction of human embryos, thus violating both the first and third conditions.

Finally, she would be violating the fourth condition since adult stem cells provide the same research benefits as embryonic stem cell lines --- and, in fact, only adult stem cells provide medical benefits. There is no morally acceptable reason for anyone to cooperate in embryonic stem cell research since one may not do evil so that good may result.

Finding 'moral relief'
However, there is no doubt that there are situations and contexts in which Catholics do find moral relief in the distinction between formal and material cooperation. Those who find themselves involved in the remote material cooperation in evil, may in fact, not be involved in actions that are personally sinful.

For example health care workers whose primary task in a hospital is the general care of patients, or who are only remotely involved with an immoral procedure would likely not be morally forbidden from performing their jobs. Nevertheless every conscientious Catholic is required to do everything in her or his power to avoid cooperating in evil, even when it is material and remote.

Another example of how this principle is applied by the Church is provided by the U.S. bishops who recently integrated Cardinal Ratzinger's 2004 memorandum into Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, their latest teachings for U.S. Catholics as the 2008 U.S. presidential race nears:

---A Catholic cannot vote for a candidate who takes a position in favor of an intrinsic evil, such as abortion or racism, if the voter's intent is to support that position. In such cases a Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in grave evil. At the same time, a voter should not use a candidate's opposition to an intrinsic evil to justify indifference or inattentiveness to other important moral issues involving human life and dignity (n. 35).

---There may be times when a Catholic who rejects a candidate's unacceptable position may decide to vote for that candidate for other morally grave reasons. Voting in this way would be permissible only for truly grave moral reasons…(n. 36).

The understanding of the distinction between formal and material cooperation in evil has proven useful to the Church's Magisterium and is found deeply rooted in the Catholic moral tradition. While it, like any moral principle, can be misused, it is important for us to understand it well and see it for what it is: a useful tool for moral analysis and important theological insight that the Church has accepted to help Catholics walk the way of authentic discipleship in a world that is constantly shifting and presenting ever more complex moral dilemmas to the baptized faithful.

Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, updated in November 2007 by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, may be viewed online at http://www.faithfulcitizenship.org/ . It may also be ordered from the USCCB, 3211 4th St. NE, Washington, DC 20017-1194. Vincentian Father Richard Benson is academic dean and professor of moral theology at St. John's Seminary, Camarillo. His column appears monthly in The Tidings.