The first step toward salvaging U.S. policy in Iraq is to name the violence for what it is, "and civil war it is not," writes George A. Lopez, of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana. Jesuit Father John Langan of Georgetown University says that the U.S. must redefine its objectives to meet the demands of a task in Iraq that today is not the same as that started in 2003.

The necessary withdrawal of troops should be conditional
By Rev. John Langan, SJ

What is a just end to the war in Iraq? An Iraq that is stable, secular, unified, democratic, determining its destiny, respecting its minorities' rights and at peace with its neighbors, and not providing support or refuge for terrorists.

The Bush administration has aimed at this the last three years. It is a conceptually coherent, morally commendable goal. Attaining it will produce an Iraq much better off than under Saddam Hussein.

But is this attainable? The question isn't whether the U.S. and its allies can win battles, but whether battles already won can be translated into an effective government rooted in the people's will.

The administration believes that holding elections and setting up a national unity government show that democratic government is possible and desired by the majority. Many, however, are convinced the insurgency shows that forces opposing this have the power and persistence to prevent the ultimate victory of a democratic regime.

Clearly, significant Iraqi elements would support a religious or sectarian government that would not respect minority rights. Some insurgency elements would back terrorist attacks against Israel, Persian Gulf states and the U.S. Even if the new government attracts steadfast support from a majority, it is doubtful it has sufficient strength to suppress the insurgency.

So we have a stalemate. Each side believes that keeping up the pressure can wear down its opponents' will.

Both sides, in effect, have settled into a second war, one of attrition in which American occupation and Iraqi insurgency destroy lives and the security ordinary Iraqis yearn for. Neither side feels it can let go; values it considers vital are at stake.

The good, just outcome of a democratic Iraq, still desirable, seems increasingly unattainable.

The present war of attrition is not the same task started in 2003. Whether one condemns or praises that war, the current situation presents new adversaries and questions. We must redefine our objectives so they can be attained with limited force and a renewed political strategy. Only then can we hope to avoid being defined by past mistakes.

First, we must admit Iraq's future is not for us to settle. We cannot prevent Iraq from fragmenting or sliding into some form of theocratic despotism. The Iraqis have to do that. Withdrawing American troops and letting Iraq stand on its own are morally and politically necessary.

Second, simple withdrawal of our troops doesn't meet present needs. It would put in question our ability to keep commitments in a troubled, important place. It would expose Iraqis who risked much for a democratic future to terrible retaliation, leave the country to possible use as a terrorist haven and intensify the problems of Israel and its neighbors.

Third, withdrawal must then be conditional. Having no politically well-defined adversary to negotiate with, we'll have to set the withdrawal terms ourselves. We'll need a policy that combines threats and incentives to prevent Iraq and its neighbors from launching aggressive wars and terrorist attacks, especially on Israel. We will continue to maintain forces in the Gulf region, but our policy will have to be responsive and cooperative, particularly where humanitarian intervention is needed to stop genocidal violence. We must generously offer asylum to likely victims of political violence.

Fourth, efforts against Islamic terrorism must be refocused, making clear we are not proposing to reconstruct the Islamic world. Defense against attacks is legitimate but needs to strike cells, not countries; to persuade moderates and divide our enemies; to rely on international networks staffed by well-trained, patient, enterprising people. The notion that preventing terrorism justifies wider wars must be renounced.

Fifth, a policy so carelessly conceived and poorly implemented as the 2003 occupation of Iraq carries penalties. The outcome settled for will be considerably less good than hoped. Wise leadership will be needed to guide us through the process of trimming desires to fit possibilities.

Jesuit Father John Langan is the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Professor of Catholic Social Thought at Georgetown University in Washington.

Sound decisions require naming the situation correctly
By George A. Lopez

Beyond the escalating, terrible killings in Iraq over recent weeks lies a tragedy of a different sort: Washington's inability to comprehend the nature of this violence. As part of its goal of "fighting the terrorists" who oppose our presence, the Bush administration has been focused for two years on averting civil war in Iraq.

Taking the government's cue, journalists repeatedly ask, "Is this civil war yet?" The debated answers proceed only within that narrow fixation.

It's time to offer an outside-the-box answer. It's not civil war. It's so much worse.

Insurgency laced with terrorism operates alongside decentralized, multigroup, anarchic violence aimed primarily at fellow Iraqis and the emergence of a functioning Iraqi government. The killers range from gang members who kidnap for profit to assassins motivated by economics or political beliefs. Then there are the ever-opportunistic and brutal al-Qaida killings and bombings. And, without a doubt, recent weeks saw a dramatic increase in faction-based attacks and revenge killing by Sunni and Shiite organized death squads and their not-so-clandestine militias.

Iraq has become its own blend of Lebanon, Liberia or Somalia at their worst. There is now an efficient economy of scale to the violence in Iraq that finds its own sick, devastating equilibrium point so that armed groups can avoid direct confrontation with each other and smaller, entrepreneurial kidnappers and killers can operate at will.

Because the U.S. has a lot of people on the ground and a lot of firepower, Americans still make good targets. But the cold, hard truth is that the U.S. increasingly is sidelined in much of the Iraq violence. We can seldom pre-empt the violence or contain it.

The Bush administration maintains that the Iraqi political factions trying to construct a functioning, democratic government, aided by the energetic U.S. ambassador, can create the grand political bargain that will silence the guns and bombs. But even in such an unlikely scenario, Iraq will remain a land with citizens armed to the teeth, who have few economic opportunities.

This means violence will be ongoing, increasingly criminalized --- possibly through links to terrorist networks --- and more lethal as religious or ethnic groups feel increasingly pressured to avenge yesterday's killings. The violence will be self-perpetuating.

The Iraqi ruling circle may be able to create safe pockets and the semblance of governance in places like the U.S.-protected Green Zone. But generally neither the capital nor other cities are safe. Infrastructure will continue to deteriorate, meaning less electricity and usable water for desperate, fearful and angry people. There will be no new jobs, except to replace those killed on the job.

If recent speeches and comments to the press are any indication, the Bush administration cannot or will not acknowledge the terrible reality engulfing Iraq. Preventing civil war, defined as limiting Sunni-Shiite confrontations and killings, is presented as what matters. When violent spasms produce large casualty numbers on a given day, Washington tends to call attention to the role of terrorists and outsiders, most lately the Iranians. This only adds to the misconstrued reality of Iraq's daily violence.

If there is any hope of salvaging U.S. policy in Iraq or making sound decisions about curtailing the terrible violence for Iraqis, surely the first step must be naming it for what it is. And civil war it is not.

George A. Lopez is a senior fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana.